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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the financial characteristics of firms that are listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. 
The primary focus of the study is to capture the financial attributes of firms that display positive and 
negative stock returns, and firms that display low and high standard deviation in their stock returns. 
The study also examines the behaviour of firms that belong to ATHEX as well as other market 
indices, such as FTSE 20, FTSE International, etc. The study categorises listed firms based on size, 
growth, profitability, liquidity and leverage, and assesses their financial behaviour and 
performance. Firms with high profitability and growth, liquidity and dividend payout tend to attract 
investors’ interest and display positive stock returns. Firms with unfavourable financial figures and 
uncertainty appear to exhibit significant volatility in their stock returns. Firms that are politically 
and financially visible, either due to size or because they belong to a market index, tend to carefully 
organise their actions and meet financial analysts’ forecasts. Firms distribute high dividends and 
pay their creditors timely in order to attract investors, satisfy creditors and favourably affect stock 
market participants. Overall, firms structure their decision-making so as to improve their financial 
profile and performance, and influence the picture that the stock market has about their managerial 
abilities and future prospects. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
his paper focuses on the period 1 January to 31 December 2004 and examines the financial 
characteristics of firms that are listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). The primary focus of the 
study is to capture the financial attributes of firms that display positive and negative stock returns, and 
firms that display low and high volatility in their stock returns. The study gives particular emphasis on the 
identification and interpretation of the financial factors that influence the stock returns of listed firms as well as the 
volatility that the stock returns appear to exhibit. The paper also examines the behaviour of firms that belong to stock 
market indices, and mainly whether being a market index constituent affects their decisions and actions. In particular, 
the study focuses on the main ASE index, i.e. ATHEX, as well as other market indices, such as FTSE 20, FTSE 
International, etc. To better describe the picture of the Athens stock market, the study categorises the listed firms using 
accounting measures, such as size, growth, profitability, liquidity and leverage. Here, the study presents the various 
categorisations of firms that exist in the Athens stock market, and explains how their key financial characteristics 
influence their financial numbers and actions. The paper shows how the decision to distribute dividends to 
shareholders impacts on listed firms‟ financial numbers, while it also presents the distinguishing financial attributes of 
the latter against firms that pay no dividends. Finally, the paper analyses the financial features of firms that display 
high and low trading volume, and studies the association between trading volume, stock returns and financial 
measures. 
 
The motivation of the study is associated with the provision of a thorough financial picture of the Athens 
Stock market and of the listed firms‟ behaviour to investors and other market participants, in order to assist them to 
evaluate firms‟ financial performance more efficiently and better structure their investment strategies. The study is 
also motivated by the question of whether the stock returns reflect the true and fair financial picture of firms; that is 
T 
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whether the stock market sees through firms‟ financial performance and rewards those firms with favourable financial 
figures and prospects. The question that subsequently arises, and is under investigation in the paper, is what kind of 
firms exhibit positive stock returns and high trading volume. Another set of motives relates to whether listed firms that 
are politically and financially visible, e.g. those firms that belong to a stock market index, influence their behaviour in 
order to impress and satisfy market participants and financial authorities, or attract investors.  
 
 The remaining sections of the study are as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review of the study. 
Sections 3 and 4 describe the research hypotheses and the data sets respectively. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
findings, and Section 6 presents the conclusions of the study.  
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Accounting Choices 
 
Accounting policy choice is associated with contractual arrangements, such as compensation schemes and debt 
covenants as well as asset pricing, information asymmetry and political costs (Scott, 1997; Han and Wang, 1998; 
Francis, 2001; Lambert, 2001). The preparation of financial statements involves accounting policy choice and often 
requires an exercise of judgement (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Hence, there might be cases where 
managers‟ behaviour is opportunistic aiming at the reinforcement of their wealth and interests (Healy, 1985; Dechow 
and Sloan, 1991; Dye and Verrecchia, 1995).  
 
Managers may use discretionary accounting policies in order to improve the company financial results 
(Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Young, 1998; Pope et al, 2000; Bushee, 2001) and positively influence their 
compensation (Healy, 1985; Dye and Verrecchia, 1995). It follows, thus, that the timing of gains and losses 
recognition is important (Balsam et al, 1995; Francis, Hanna and Vincent, 1996; Gaver and Gaver, 1998). In certain 
cases, managers may structure their accounting policy choice so as to transfer earnings from “good” accounting years 
to “bad” years (DeFond and Park, 1997; Han and Wang, 1998; Guidry et al, 1999). Firms also make use of 
discretionary accounting policies in order to avoid the risks of bankruptcy, financial distress or debt covenant violation 
(Holthausen, 1990; Sweeney, 1994; May, 1995). This should be the case especially under significant earnings 
volatility and price fluctuation (Cahan, 1992; Dechow et al, 1995, 1996 and 1997; Karmon and Lubwama, 1997).
1
  
 
 Managers are also inclined to manage the reported accounting numbers in order to influence the behaviour or 
response of third parties, such as government and tax authorities, regulatory bodies, shareholders, lenders, etc., and 
avoid the incurrence of agency or political costs (Adiel, 1996; Eldenburg and Soderstrom, 1996; Fields et al, 2001). 
The political costs are linked to the size of the firm as well as to the size of the reported earnings (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Ali and Kumar, 1994). Large firms are to a larger extent exposed to political costs, since their large size is likely 
to attract the attention of government and regulatory bodies, which may in turn assess how consistently the former 
adhere to accounting regulation (Moses, 1987; Ndubizu and Tsetsekos, 1992). It is reported that firms may manage 
their key accounting figures in order to be consistent with accounting regulation (Blacconiere et al, 1991; D‟Souza, 
1998). Following that market participants may not be always able to identify the effects of earnings management 
(Hirst and Hopkins, 1998), the provision of informative accounting disclosures may capture the impact of accounting 
policy choice on reported earnings, and thus, mitigate any adverse effects (Blacconiere and Patton, 1994; Elliott and 
Jacobson, 1994).  
 
2.2 Stock Returns And Firm Financial Characteristics 
 
Accounting measures are closely associated with stock returns since they express firms‟ financial 
performance (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Kothari, 2001; Beaver, 2002). Firms tend to manage the reported earnings 
in order to impress investors and other stock market participants (Moses, 1987; Stulz, 1990; Lewellen, Park and Ro, 
1996), or avoid the risk of hostile takeovers (Perry and Williams, 1994; Erickson and Wang, 1999) or any negative 
stock market response (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). It appears that managers tend to influence their decision-
making and course of action in order to meet financial analysts‟ forecasts and investors‟ expectations (Levitt, 1998; 
Kasznik, 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2005).
2
 In the light of the flexibility that is allowed in financial reporting, the stock 
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market seems to value the discretionary treatment of accruals, as it could enhance the information content and 
explanatory power of the reported earnings (Subramanyam, 1996). 
 
It is evident that financial leverage provides information about the capital structure of the firm and the ability 
of the latter to efficiently meet its financial obligations and debt covenants (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and 
Weintrop, 1990). Changes in the operating and investing activities of firms tend to significantly affect their financial 
leverage and capital structure. Thus, changes in financial leverage would tend to reflect changes in firm financial 
performance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This implies that changes in financial leverage would also be associated with 
changes in stock returns, since the latter express firm financial performance and future prospects.  
 
When the share price drops, following for example a bad news announcement, the market value of equity 
would also tend to drop, leading thus to a higher debt to equity ratio. This is known as the leverage effect (see Merton, 
1974; Christie, 1982) and tends to significantly affect investors‟ perceptions about firms‟ managerial ability and future 
prospects. On the other hand, the volatility effect (French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Campbell and Hentschel, 
1992; Bekaert and Wu, 2000; Kim, Morley and Nelson, 2004) would tend to increase investors‟ required rate of return 
and affect the share prices accordingly (see also Datar, Naik and Radcliffe, 1998; Easley, Hvidkjaer and O‟Hara, 
2002). This should also hold when firms borrow funds, in which case investors‟ required rate of return would tend to 
be higher following their higher expectations of the efficient use of capital and the future returns that would 
consequently be generated (Eberhart and Siddique, 2002). Hence, highly leveraged firms would be inclined to make 
decisions or alter the disclosure of key accounting figures so as to give a positive signal to the stock market and 
positively affect the stock returns. 
 
Firms are motivated to influence the reported earnings and stock returns, especially when managers‟ 
remuneration is linked to stock option schemes and stock performance (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Matsunaga, 
1995; Yermack, 1997; Chung et al, 2002). To achieve this objective, managers may also provide voluntary disclosures 
to favourably affect the stock market participants‟ perceptions and expectations. The literature shows that the 
abnormal stock returns that follow the stock option awards tend to be significantly positive, while they appear to be 
insignificant in the period before (Aboody and Kasznick, 2000). Similar considerations would apply in the case where 
firms are faced with political, agency and regulatory costs, which could potentially affect the stock returns negatively 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Blacconiere et al, 1991; Cahan et al, 1997; Doukas et al, 2005). The above costs may 
be reduced or controlled by monitoring the actions of managers and using financial analysts‟ forecasts of firm future 
performance (Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Lundstrum, 2003). The process of monitoring, however, may be costly and 
time-consuming, and in certain cases not feasible (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 
2000). The literature shows that the use of borrowings may lead to lower agency costs (Jensen, 1986; Jensen, Solberg 
and Zorn, 1992; Noronha, Shome and Morgan, 1996) since firms will have to meet certain interest payments and debt 
covenants, while they will be monitored by banks, financial institutions, bond rating agencies, etc. (see also Rozeff, 
1982; Alli, Khan and Ramirez, 1993; Dempsey, Laber and Rozeff, 1993; Brous and Kini, 1994). 
 
High firm turnover and profitability would tend to positively affect the stock returns (Brennan and Titman, 
1994; Wermers, 2000). The association between turnover and stock returns is also affected by firm liquidity 
(Lesmond, Ogden and Trzinka, 1999; Rouwenhorst, 1999; Sang-Gyung et al, 2003). A positive relation between the 
two would suggest that the liquidity of the firm could cover its financial obligations, and thus have a favourable 
impact on firm value. Such considerations are useful for investors when constructing their portfolios (Domnowitz, 
Glen and Madhavan, 2001). Firms that operate in a growth area would tend to exhibit positive future prospects, and 
therefore, the associated stock returns would be expected to be higher reflecting their higher potential (Daniel and 
Titman, 1997; Dey, 2005). Such firms would like to avoid negative stock market responses to their actions and 
accounting figures. The literature suggests that they might use forecast management techniques to influence the 
perceptions of financial analysts and investors (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004; 
Bartov et al, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002; Brown and Higgins, 2005). 
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3 Research Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Stock Returns And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
The study focuses on the stock returns of firms that are listed on the ASE, and examines the financial 
characteristics of firms that exhibit positive returns and firms that display negative returns.
3
 The logistic regression 
that is employed to identify firms‟ financial attributes uses a dummy variable as the dependent variable, which is 
dichotomous and takes two values, i.e. 1 for firms with positive returns, and 0 for firms with negative returns. The 
formula that is used to obtain the annual stock returns is as follows (Strong, p. 535, 1992): 
 
jtR  = 
1
1


jt
jtjtjt
P
PDP
,               (1) 
 
where jtP  is the price of security j at the end of period t; 
jtD   is the dividend paid during period t; 
1jtP  is the price of security j at the end of period t-1. 
 
The hypothesis that is tested is the following: 
 
H0 1 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms that display positive or negative stock 
returns. The alternative hypothesis is that firms that display positive stock returns have distinctive financial 
characteristics compared to firms that display negative returns. 
 
3.2 Volatility In Stock Returns And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
The paper also studies the volatility in stock returns and seeks to identify the financial characteristics of firms 
that display high volatility and firms that exhibit low volatility. The volatility in stock returns is expressed by the 
standard deviation of stock returns. The logistic regression uses a dummy variable as the dependent variable that takes 
two values, i.e. 1 for firms with high volatility in stock returns, and 0 for firms with low volatility. This categorisation 
is performed using the median value of the observations obtained for the variable VOLAT. The hypothesis that is 
tested is as follows: 
 
H0 2 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms that display high or low volatility in 
stock returns. The alternative hypothesis is that firms that display high volatility in stock returns have 
distinctive financial characteristics compared to firms that display low volatility. 
 
3.3 Factors That Influence The Stock Returns And Their Volatility  
 
The paper examines the financial measures that influence listed firms‟ stock returns and their volatility. To 
carry out the above analysis, the study runs two linear regressions. The first linear regression assesses the association 
between stock returns and firm financial measures. The second linear regression examines the association between 
volatility in stock returns and firm financial measures. The hypotheses that are tested are respectively the following: 
 
H0 3 Stock returns are not affected by firm financial measures. The alternative hypothesis is that firm financial 
measures do affect stock returns. 
H0 3.1 The volatility in stock returns is not affected by firm financial measures. The alternative hypothesis is that 
firm financial measures do affect the volatility in stock returns. 
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3.4 Stock Market Indices And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
The study examines the financial behaviour of firms that belong to stock market indices, such as ATHEX, 
FTSE 20, FTSE International, E-Income and E-IPO. Firstly, the study compares the firms that belong to ATHEX with 
a control sample, i.e. those firms that are outside ATHEX. The dependent dummy variable in the logistic regression 
takes two values, i.e. 1 for firms within ATHEX, and 0 for the control sample firms. Secondly, the study examines 
comparatively the financial characteristics of the firms that belong to the above market indices. The dependent dummy 
variable in the logistic regression takes the following values: 1 for firms that belong to E-Income, and 0 for firms that 
belong to ATHEX. Similar logistic regressions are applied for the comparisons between E-IPO vs. ATHEX, FTSE 20 
vs. E-Income, and FTSE International vs. E-Income. The hypotheses that are tested are respectively the following: 
 
H0 4 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms that are inside or outside ATHEX. The 
alternative hypothesis is that firms that belong to ATHEX have distinctive financial characteristics compared 
to firms that are outside ATHEX. 
H0 4.1 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms that belong to different stock market 
indices. The alternative hypothesis is that firms that belong to different stock market indices have distinctive 
financial characteristics. 
 
3.5 Key Accounting Measures And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
 Seeking to identify listed firms‟ financial attributes, the study focuses on key accounting measures, such as 
firm size, growth, profitability, liquidity and leverage. Firms are categorised into groups based on the size of the above 
measures, and then tested for differences in their financial behaviour and characteristics. For example, the analysis 
splits the sample firms into high and low profitability firms, in order to examine their financial attributes and 
differences (if any). This also encompasses an analysis of the stock return behaviour of the respective groups of firms. 
The dependent dummy variable in the logistic regression takes the following values: 1 for high profitability firms, and 
0 for low profitability firms. This categorisation is performed using the median value of the variable EPS. Similar 
logistic regressions are applied when using size, growth, liquidity and leverage measures. The hypothesis that is tested 
is as follows: 
 
H0 5 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms that display high or low size, growth, 
profitability, liquidity or leverage measures. The alternative hypothesis is that firms that display high size, 
growth, profitability, liquidity or leverage measures have distinctive financial characteristics compared to 
firms that display low such measures. 
 
3.6 Dividend Distribution And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
The study examines whether dividend distribution has significant impact on firm financial performance and 
stock returns. The study splits the sample firms based on whether they distribute dividends or not. The dependent 
dummy variable in the logistic regression takes the following values: 1 for firms that distribute dividends, and 0 for 
firms that do not distribute dividends. The hypothesis that is tested is as follows: 
 
H0 6 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms that distribute or do not distribute 
dividends. The alternative hypothesis is that firms that distribute dividends have distinctive financial 
characteristics compared to firms that do not distribute dividends. 
 
3.7 Trading Volume and Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
 The study assesses the association between trading volume and firm financial measures and stock returns, in 
order to interpret the movements in the trading volume of listed firms. The dependent dummy variable in the logistic 
regression takes two values, i.e. 1 for firms with positive change in trading volume, and 0 for firms with negative 
change in trading volume. This categorisation is performed based on the change in trading volume that firms exhibit 
throughout the period under investigation, and is obtained using the formula below.  
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1
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where TVjt is the trading volume of security j at the end of period t; 
TVjt-1 is the trading volume of security j at the end of period t-1. 
 
 The hypothesis that is tested is as follows: 
 
H0 7 There is no difference in the financial characteristics between firms with positive or negative change in 
trading volume. The alternative hypothesis is that firms with positive change in trading volume have 
distinctive financial characteristics compared to firms with negative change in trading volume. 
 
4 Data  
 
The study has used the binary logistic regression analysis and the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test to test the 
research hypotheses. The empirical analysis concentrates on the accounting period 1 January – 31 December 2004. 
The sample consists of 254 firms that are listed on the ASE. The study examines the financial characteristics of firms 
that belong to the Athens stock market as a whole, but also assesses empirically and comparatively the financial 
attributes of firms that belong to different stock market indices. The study focuses on the following market indices: 
ATHEX, FTSE 20, FTSE International, E-Income and E-IPO. Financial data regarding firms‟ stock returns and stock 
market index structure were obtained from „www.e-net.gr‟ and „www.ase.gr‟. ATHEX is a composite price index and 
is composed of the most highly capitalised shares of the Athens main stock market. ATHEX reflects general trends of 
the stock market. E-Income consists of firms that display the highest positive change in earnings in the last 3 years. E-
IPO refers to initial public offerings and consists of firms that listed their shares on the Athens Stock Exchange in the 
previous 12-month period. FTSE 20 consists of the largest listed firms. The relevant participation criteria relate to 
capitalisation, marketability and dispersion. FTSE International
4
 is composed of firms that have international 
exposure, and subsidiaries and interests in foreign countries. Accounting and financial data were collected from firms‟ 
financial statements obtained in their physical form. The analysis has excluded banks, insurance, pension and 
brokerage firms, as their accounting measures are not always comparable with those of industrial firms. Appendix 1 
presents the industrial sector structure of the sample firms. Appendix 2 shows the explanatory variables that are 
employed in the empirical analysis. 
 
5 Empirical Findings 
 
5.1 Stock Returns And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that firms that display positive stock returns exhibit significantly different financial 
characteristics compared to firms that display negative returns. Hence, H0 1 can be rejected. It appears that the stock 
market rewards firms that perform well and exhibit good financial performance. In other words, firms that display 
favourable and positive financial figures have been found to exhibit positive stock returns. In particular, firms with 
positive stock returns tend to be more profitable (OPM and EPS) and exhibit higher liquidity (CUR) and growth 
(MVBV) measures. In an efficient stock market, the display of accounting figures, such as the ones presented above, 
would tend to attract investors and positively impact on firms‟ stock returns. The specific firms also pay higher 
dividend (DIVSH) to their shareholders, and thus, positively affect the perceptions of the stock market and the price 
movements of their share.  
 
The finding that firms with positive stock returns exhibit higher leverage (TLSFU and DEBTE), which in 
turn reflects their higher financial obligations, such as interest payments and debt covenant restrictions, appears not to 
adversely affect firms‟ stock returns. This results from the fact that the higher profitability and liquidity of those firms 
would aid them to efficiently and timely meet their financial obligations. On the other hand, higher leverage means 
that firms have more capital available to fulfil their business objectives. This in association with the higher growth 
potential of the specific firms implies that investors‟ required rate of return would tend to be higher. The significantly 
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positive coefficient of sales per share (SALESHA) shows that size and political costs play a significant role and are 
taken into consideration by stock market participants. Large firms are significantly exposed to scrutiny and political 
attention, and therefore, tend to influence their decisions and accounting choices in order to minimise any political and 
agency costs that might otherwise arise and improve their financial profile (Kim and Kross, 1998). Indeed, Panel A 
shows that firms with positive stock returns tend to be larger (SALESHA). The results of the K-W test (Panel A of 
Table 2) are similar with those of the logistic regression presented above.  
 
 
Table 1 Regression Analysis 
 
Panel A:   Panel B:   Panel C:   Panel D:   
Positive vs negative stock returns 
High vs low volatility in stock 
returns Stock returns  Volatility in stock returns 
                      
Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   
SALESHA 0.111 ** AR -3.909 ** VOLAT -231.103 *** SALESHA 0.00001 ** 
 (0.053)   (1.765)   (65.491)   (3.704)  
OPM 44.789 *** SALESHA 0.194 ** SALESHA -0.003  NAVSH 0.00005 *** 
 (16.493)   (0.099)   (0.003)   (0.00001)  
NPM -44.157 *** MVBV 1.007 *** MVBV -0.056  INTTA 0.001 * 
 (16.779)   (0.338)   (0.038)   (0.0006)  
CUR 0.914 * NAVSH -0.093  NAVSH 0.035  INTCOV -0.035 *** 
 (0.568)   (0.091)   (0.028)   (0.0001)  
MVBV 2.374 ** INTTA 2.764  SALETAS 0.156 * TLSFU 0.0002 ** 
 (1.153)   (2.46)   (0.092)   (0.00009)  
TLSFU 1.567 *** DIVSH 10.614 * INTTA -0.254  CFM -0.002 *** 
 (0.653)   (6.111)   (0.158)   (0.0004)  
DIVSH 6.436 *** OPM -7.893 *** DIVSH 1.152 ** CREDT -0.0009 *** 
 (2.023)   (3.117)   (0.477)   (0.0002)  
CGEAR -7.587 *** CREDT 0.085  DIVYI -0.003  DEBTE 0.001 *** 
 (2.661)   (0.056)   (0.002)   (0.0003)  
DEBTE 5.530 *** DEBTE 0.949 *** DIVCOV 0.021 * ROCE -0.002 *** 
 (1.746)   (0.405)   (0.012)   (0.0002)  
EPS 10.436 *** QUI -1.792 ** OPM 1.391 ** HOLTA 0.0009 *** 
 (2.686)   (0.804)   (0.674)   (0.0003)  
Constant -0.721  CGEAR 1.911  NPM -0.914 ** AR -0.002 *** 
 (1.045)   (1.414)   (0.377)   (0.0002)  
   IGEAR -0.501  CREDT 0.008 * Constant -0.00002  
    (0.561)   (0.004)   (0.0002)  
   EPS 1.212  CASH 0.578 **    
    (0.806)   (0.282)     
   Constant -3.127  ROSC 0.624 *    
    (1.714)   (0.323)     
      IGEAR -0.096     
       (0.181)     
      DEBTE 0.593 ***    
       (0.175)     
      PE 0.235 *    
       (0.133)     
      Constant -0.165     
              (0.258)         
Model χ2 62.845 *** Model χ2 42.930 *** Model R2 0.845  Model R2 0.910  
% 
correctly 
classified  88.5 *** 
% correctly 
classified  81.1 *** F-statistic 6.755 *** F-statistic 29.631 *** 
Sample 
size N1=38, N2=207  Sample size N1=125, N2=120 
Sample 
size N=245   
Sample 
size N=245   
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed) respectively. The results presented in Table 2 are obtained using 
the logistic regression analysis, except those presented in Panels C and D, which are obtained using the linear regression analysis. All the 
explanatory variables were entered/removed from the logistic regression using a step-wise procedure with a p-value of 0.05 to enter and a p-value of 
0.10 to remove. The Wald statistic was used to test the null hypothesis that each coefficient is zero. The variables are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fourth Quarter 2007 Volume 23, Number 4 
 124 
Table 1 Regression Analysis Continued 
 
Panel E:   Panel F:   Panel G:   Panel H:   
ATHEX vs control sample E-Income vs ATHEX  E-IPO vs ATHEX  FTSE 20 vs E-Income  
                   
Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   
NAVSH 0.292 *** EPS 6199.684 * DEBTE 10.692 * QUI 1.288  
 (0.083)   (3432.572)   (6.612)   (3.904)  
HOLTA 3.473 *** DIVSH 23.478 * VOLAT 2099.004 * SALESHA 0.238 * 
 (1.395)   (13.266)   (1114.523)   (0.139)  
OPM 13.174 *** AR 0.891 * DEBT -0.248 *** EPS -1.349 * 
 (4.125)   (0.535)   (0.105)   (0.823)  
QUI 0.311 *** OPM 26.449 * MVBV 1.695 * SALETAS 3.843  
 (0.127)   (14.322)   (1.009)   (4.199)  
TLSFU 1.802 ** CREDT 0.169 ** DIVSH 9.901 ** PE 1.419  
 (0.902)   (0.086)   (4.972)   (1.514)  
CFM 10.615 *** SALESHA 1.814 ** CREDT 11.262 ** HOLTA -1.406  
 (3.695)   (0.926)   (5.563)   (1.532)  
DEBTE 2.826 ** INTCOV 7.892 * NPM 13.031 ** MVBV -3.569 *** 
 (1.297)   (4.202)   (5.825)   (1.499)  
ROCE 17.272 *** CFM 16.672 * PE 14.123 ** TLSFU 0.484 *** 
 (4.237)   (9.653)   (7.36)   (0.179)  
Constant -5.260  CGEAR -4.193 * Constant 6.479  AR -1.981 * 
 (1.027)   (2.32)   (6.191)   (1.2)  
   Constant -4.543     Constant 4.658  
    (3.009)      (2.955)  
            
                        
Model χ2 60.294 *** Model χ2 14.019  Model χ2 37.186 *** Model χ2 17.237 ** 
% 
correctly 
classified  84.1 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  71.8 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  92.6 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  86.2 *** 
Sample 
size N1=48, N2=206 
Sample 
size N1=22, N2=48 
Sample 
size N1=13, N2=48 
Sample 
size N1=13, N2=22 
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Table 1 Regression Analysis Continued 
 
Panel I:   Panel J:   Panel K:   Panel L:   
FTSE International vs E-Income High vs low size firms  High vs low growth firms High vs low profitability firms 
                      
Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   
VOLAT 836.323 ** DEBT -3.824 * VOLAT 1302.501 *** SALESHA 1.200 *** 
 (371.081)   (2.064)   (543.061)   (0.449)  
HOLTA 0.799 * AR 1212.982 * NAVSH -0.846 *** MVBV 3.182 *** 
 (0.461)   (666.065)   (0.273)   (0.522)  
SALETAS 3.141 * MVBV -0.901 ** SALETAS -2.792 ** DIVSH 5.183 *** 
 (1.71)   (0.448)   (1.211)   (0.979)  
CFSH -4.179 ** HOLTA 7.532 *** INTTA 5.917 ** DEBT 0.848 * 
 (1.907)   (2.68)   (2.911)   (0.475)  
DIVSH -0.338 * DIVSH 18.442 *** ETL 6.765  IGEAR 0.206 ** 
 (0.207)   (7.393)   (5.56)   (0.108)  
DEBTE 3.858 ** CUR 19.720 ** PE 12.165 * CFM 0.227 * 
 (1.958)   (9.878)   (6.776)   (0.126)  
EPS -3.433 * CREDT 8.331 *** NPM 11.896 ** AR 3.986 *** 
 (1.894)   (3.357)   (6.183)   (0.996)  
Constant -0.707  DEBTE 8.608 *** STOCKT 0.098 *** CREDT 17.057 ** 
 (0.698)   (2.594)   (0.033)   (8.832)  
   ROCE 20.744 ** DEBT 0.400 ** HOLTA 24.886 *** 
    (10.721)   (0.174)   (8.53)  
   Constant -2.950  AR 0.572 * INTCOV 0.043 ** 
    (1.687)   (0.313)   (0.022)  
      DIVSH 12.936 *** PE 30.782 *** 
       (4.621)   (6.607)  
      TLSFU 15.227 ** Constant 0.599  
       (7.501)   (0.561)  
      WCR -0.013     
       (0.009)     
      QUI -15.319 **    
       (7.446)     
      DEBTE 13.280 **    
       (6.435)     
      ROCE 30.229 ***    
       (9.178)     
      EPS 2.365 *    
       (1.373)     
      Constant -2.638     
              (1.158)         
Model χ2 11.339  Model χ2 61.792 *** Model χ2 75.989 *** Model χ2 43.056 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  74.5 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  85.1 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  77.2 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  77 *** 
Sample 
size N1=53, N2=22  
Sample 
size N1=127, N2=127 
Sample 
size N1=120, N2=119 
Sample 
size N1=124, N2=124 
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Table 1 Regression Analysis Continued 
 
Panel M:   Panel N:   Panel O:   Panel P:   
High vs low liquidity firms High vs low leverage firms 
Dividend payout vs dividend 
retention 
Positive vs negative change in trading 
volume  
                   
Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   Variables Coefficients   
AR 0.611 ** SALESHA 1.270 *** NAVSH 0.948 *** AR 4.128 *** 
 (0.311)   (0.405)   (0.383)   (1.665)  
SALETAS 9.535 *** MVBV 0.875 *** OPM 40.712 *** SALESHA 0.036  
 (3.914)   (0.332)   (15.245)   (0.023)  
DIVCOV 5.346 ** NAVSH 0.582  NPM 6.331 ** MVBV 0.757 ** 
 (2.382)   (0.59)   (2.952)   (0.365)  
NPM 43.788 * DIVCOV 16.546 *** DEBT 0.493 * DIVSH 7.083 * 
 (24.652)   (7.077)   (0.307)   (3.76)  
STOCKT 1.436 *** DIVYI 0.097 *** CFM 13.447 * CREDT 0.180 * 
 (0.53)   (0.036)   (7.856)   (0.099)  
CREDT 0.099 ** PLOWB -0.871 ** DEBTE 2.430 * DIVCOV 0.244 ** 
 (0.044)   (0.444)   (1.496)   (0.128)  
DEBT 3.116 *** NPM -61.779 *** EPS 9.848 ** ROSC 23.020 *** 
 (1.127)   (20.621)   (4.789)   (9.056)  
ROSC 81.580 ** STOCKT 0.063 *** PE 19.798 ** CUR 1.537 * 
 (37.125)   (0.02)   (10.003)   (0.839)  
CGEAR 26.598 *** DEBT 0.057 * Constant 1.008  DEBTE -0.200 * 
 (9.589)   (0.034)   (1.497)   (0.121)  
INTCOV 0.974 *** CUR 0.216     PE -44.119  
 (0.39)   (0.285)      (36.774)  
Constant -6.397  CFM 18.270 *    Constant -0.091  
 (4.537)   (10.396)      (1.388)  
   ROCE -86.744 ***       
    (23.432)        
   EPS -10.881 ***       
    (4.373)        
   PE 6.172 **       
    (3.208)        
   Constant -4.438        
    (2.021)        
                        
Model χ2 84.002 *** Model χ2 65.745 *** Model χ2 123.538 *** Model χ2 25.678 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  95.1 *** 
% 
correctly 
classified  89.3 *** 
% correctly 
classified  92.1 *** 
% correctly 
classified  84.1 *** 
Sample 
size N1=127, N2=127                   
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Table 2 Kruskal - Wallis Statistic 
 
 Panel A: Panel B: Panel C: Panel D: Panel E: Panel F: Panel G: 
 Positive vs negative 
stock returns 
High vs low 
volatility in stock 
returns 
ATHEX vs 
control sample 
E-Income vs 
ATHEX 
E-IPO vs 
ATHEX 
FTSE 20 vs E-
Income 
FTSE 
International 
vs E-Income 
                      
Variables K-W statistic K-W statistic K-W statistic K-W statistic K-W statistic K-W statistic K-W statistic 
MV 9.838 a *** 7.066 a *** 93.019 a *** 0.074 a  20.969 a *** 7.187 a *** 0.130 a  
BV 8.033 a *** 0.384 a  71.227 a *** 0.008 a  14.089 a *** 1.820 b  0.054 a  
SALES 13.339 a *** 0.011 a  48.928 a *** 0.081 b  15.150 a *** 4.269 a ** 0.296 a  
SALESHA 34.658 a *** 0.211 a  20.257 a *** 0.232 b  8.456 a *** 1.712 b  0.208 a ** 
NAVSH 42.699 a *** 0.227 a  41.157 a *** 0.090 b  15.895 a *** 0.286 b  0.058 b  
SALETAS 5.926 a *** 0.193 a  0.033 a  0.289 b  0.179 b  0.590 b  0.487 a  
MVBV 0.981 a * 16.172 a *** 2.096 a  0.075 a  2.608 b  4.852 b ** 0.001 a  
OPM 12.698 a *** 0.946 a  24.730 a *** 0.121 b  3.291 a * 0.066 b  0.077 a  
NPM 11.709 a *** 1.208 a  19.505 a *** 0.074 a * 0.150 a  0.168 b  0.062 a  
ROSC 11.052 a *** 0.472 a  11.941 a *** 0.044 b  0.052 b  3.215 b * 0.099 a  
ROCE 10.360 a *** 0.390 a  6.745 a *** 0.085 b  0.004 b  1.157 b  0.319 a  
EPS 33.178 a *** 1.149 a  33.211 a *** 0.035 b  6.462 a *** 3.196 b * 0.036 b ** 
STOCKT 2.401 a  0.001 a  11.482 a *** 0.529 a  6.962 a *** 1.074 b  0.653 b  
CREDT 2.469 a  0.030 b  0.495 a  0.057 b  0.086 b  0.063 b  0.053 a  
DEBT 9.972 a *** 0.020 b  14.050 a *** 0.237 a  4.693 a ** 3.464 b  0.031 b  
CUR 0.111 a  0.607 a  0.844 a  0.289 b  0.194 b  0.213 a  0.933 a  
CASH 4.644 a ** 0.011 b  3.292 a * 0.025 b  1.434 a  0.245 b  0.092 a  
QUI 0.010 b  0.718 a  2.766 a * 0.014 b  0.025 a  0.007 a  0.425 a  
CFM 4.101 a ** 2.998 b * 20.898 a *** 0.044 b  2.086 a  0.066 a  0.001 b  
CFSH 45.544 a *** 2.001 a  35.534 a *** 0.001 a  9.666 a *** 2.228 b  0.137 b  
TLSFU 0.016 b  3.317 a * 1.260 b  0.548 a  2.060 b  1.470 b  0.395 b  
CGEAR 0.008 a  3.769 a ** 0.480 b  1.063 a  1.768 b  3.338 a * 0.824 b  
INTCOV 16.574 a *** 2.515 a  15.839 a *** 1.527 b  2.814 a * 4.332 a  0.216 a  
IGEAR 2.476 b  4.063 b  2.123 b  1.436 a  1.633 b  0.026 b  1.108 b  
DEBTE 0.504 a  1.353 b  4.636 a ** 2.271 a  0.173 a  3.130 a * 1.968 a * 
INTTA 0.611 a  2.061 a  3.032 a  0.000 a  0.322 b  1.526 b  0.004 a  
HOLTA 0.141 a  0.285 a  3.123 a * 0.796 b  7.167 a  0.590 a  0.066 a  
AR    28.802 b *** 4.898 a ** 1.637 a * 0.076 a  0.820 b * 1.818 a  
VOLAT 0.770 a     29.907 a  0.914 a  17.235 a *** 2.571 b  1.542 a ** 
DIVSH 19.876 a *** 2.156 a  23.556 a *** 1.315 b  11.490 a *** 0.919 b  0.844 a  
DIVYI 5.080 a ** 0.023 a  6.605 a *** 4.761 a ** 5.811 a ** 1.665 a  4.767 a  
DIVCOV 6.297 a *** 0.839 a  0.287 a  0.018 a  1.288 b  1.191 b  0.436 b  
PLOWB 0.033 a  0.645 a  0.057 b  0.169 a  6.855 b  1.685 b  0.440 b  
PE 2.809 b   0.300 b   0.563 a   0.557 a   0.005 a   1.184 a   0.002 b   
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. a indicates that the mean rank of the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) statistic is larger for: Panel A: firms with high stock returns; Panel B: firms with high volatility in stock returns; 
Panel C: firms that belong to ATHEX; Panel D: firms that belong to E-Income; Panel E: firms that belong to E-IPO; Panel F: firms 
that belong to FTSE 20; Panel G: firms that belong to FTSE International; Panel H: large firms; Panel I: high growth firms; Panel J: 
high profitability firms; Panel K: high liquidity firms; Panel L: high leverage firms; Panel M: firms that pay dividends; Panel N: 
firms with positive change in trading volume. In Panel A, the variable "stock returns" (AR) is not included in the analysis because 
it is used to categorise the sample firms into firms with positive and negative returns. In Panel B, the variable "volatility in stock 
returns" (VOLAT) is not included in the analysis because it is used to categorise the sample firms into firms with high and low 
volatility in stock returns. In Panel H, the size variables are not included in the analysis because the sample firms have been 
categorised based on size into large and small firms. In Panel I, the growth variable "market value to book value" (MVBV) is not 
included in the analysis because it is used to categorise the sample firms into high and low growth firms. In Panel J, the profitability 
variables are not included in the analysis because the sample firms have been categorised based on profitability into high and low 
profitability firms. In Panel K, the liquidity variables are not included in the analysis because the sample firms have been 
categorized based on liquidity into high and low liquidity firms. In Panel L, the leverage variables are not included in the analysis 
because the sample firms have been categorised based on leverage into high and low leverage firms. In Panel M, the dividend 
variables are not included in the analysis because the sample firms have been categorised based on dividend distribution into firms 
that pay dividends and firms that do not distribute dividends. The variables are presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2 Kruskal - Wallis Statistic (cntd.) 
 
 Panel H:  Panel I:  Panel J:  Panel K:  Panel L:  Panel M:  Panel N:  
 
High vs low size 
firms 
High vs low 
growth firms 
High vs low 
profitability 
firms 
High vs low 
liquidity firms 
High vs low 
leverage firms 
Dividend payout 
vs dividend 
retention 
Positive vs 
negative 
change in 
trading volume  
                      
Variables 
            K-W 
statistic 
           K-W 
statistic 
           K-W 
statistic 
           K-W 
statistic 
          K-W 
statistic 
            K-W 
statistic 
          K-W 
statistic 
MV    4.114 a ** 17.612 a *** 0.013 b  13.349 a *** 12.242 a *** 0.810 b  
BV    33.097 b *** 7.535 a *** 0.186 b  12.627 a *** 1.546 a  1.215 b  
SALES    3.780 b ** 22.756 a *** 8.726 a *** 24.187 a *** 7.530 a *** 3.765 a ** 
SALESHA   0.516 b  70.281 a *** 2.447 b  8.844 a *** 9.013 a *** 1.357 a  
NAVSH    5.374 b ** 73.757 a *** 1.308 a  1.376 a  9.027 a *** 9.632 a *** 
SALETAS    6.379 a *** 14.769 a *** 3.775 b  0.120 b  4.802 a ** 1.695 b  
MVBV 3.368 a     8.541 a *** 0.374 a  2.468 b  5.825 a ** 6.096 a *** 
OPM 12.831 a *** 8.340 a ***    15.395 a *** 1.019 b  50.270 a *** 2.009 a  
NPM 7.522 a *** 8.008 a ***    18.086 a *** 1.235 b  60.290 a *** 3.737 a ** 
ROSC 2.064 a  13.403 a ***    3.919 a ** 0.067 a  52.048 a *** 1.006 a  
ROCE 0.164 a  23.688 a ***    0.557 b  0.013 a  22.201 a *** 0.694 a  
EPS 12.569 a *** 4.170 a **    5.575 a ** 0.290 a  65.634 a *** 6.149 a *** 
STOCKT 10.766 a *** 3.587 a * 4.434 a **    0.583 a  0.047 b  4.518 b ** 
CREDT 1.396 a  0.087 a  3.269 a *    0.420 b  4.289 a ** 0.002 a  
DEBT 6.687 a *** 2.388 a  15.616 a ***    4.467 a ** 0.944 a  2.067 b  
CUR 0.002 a  0.439 a  4.438 a **    3.033 b * 8.598 a *** 2.651 a * 
CASH 2.103 a  2.796 a * 16.104 a ***    5.234 b ** 5.800 a ** 4.927 a ** 
QUI 0.037 a  0.433 a  4.069 a **    3.807 b ** 4.259 a ** 2.656 a * 
CFM 11.872 a *** 6.325 a *** 45.597 a ***    2.040 b  27.266 a *** 4.979 a ** 
CFSH 11.651 a *** 0.939 a  #### a ***    4.387 a ** 28.469 a *** 6.582 a *** 
TLSFU 1.290 b  0.762 a  1.180 b  48.331 b ***   3.119 a * 3.951 b ** 
CGEAR 0.359 b  0.028 b  1.542 b  35.619 b ***   6.236 b *** 4.516 b ** 
INTCOV 8.683 a *** 8.069 a  80.532 a *** 12.711 a ***   48.942 a *** 0.406 a  
IGEAR 4.683 b ** 2.475 a * 6.344 a *** 5.055 b **    2.038 a  1.660 b  
DEBTE 6.553 a *** 5.139 a ** 0.282 a  2.648 b *    0.999 b  7.276 b *** 
INTTA 0.097 a  2.089 a  0.207 a  0.318 a  0.093 b  0.848 a  2.890 a  
HOLTA 17.940 a *** 4.755 b  0.231 b  7.840 b  3.246 a  1.307 a  1.550 b  
AR 15.586 a *** 0.043 b  52.710 a *** 0.395 a  1.399 a  10.123 a *** 3.384 a * 
VOLAT 1.585 a  24.989 a *** 3.195 a  0.463 a  0.031 b  0.890 a  3.099 a  
DIVSH 19.454 a *** 4.619 a ** #### a *** 6.957 a *** 0.003 a     1.157 a * 
DIVYI 7.023 a *** 0.019 a  63.575 a *** 6.622 a *** 0.085 a     0.815 b  
DIVCOV 1.306 b  1.269 a  25.448 a *** 1.008 b  0.073 a     1.810 a  
PLOWB 0.828 b  0.020 a  3.248 a  0.583 b  1.059 a  27.544 b  0.289 b  
PE 2.601 a   0.702 a   2.141 b   6.542 a *** 0.521 b   42.652 a *** 1.232 b   
 
 
5.2 Volatility In Stock Returns And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that there are significant financial differences between firms that display high and 
low volatility in stock returns.
5
 Thus, H0 2 can be rejected. It appears that stock volatility is closely related to firm 
financial performance and investors‟ perceptions and expectations. Panel B shows that firms that display high 
volatility in stock returns tend to exhibit higher leverage (DEBTE), which in turn adversely affects firm profitability 
(OPM) and liquidity (QUI) measures. The specific firms also display higher growth potential (MVBV), which 
signifies that they may currently use more debt finance, in order to realise their business plans, expecting to generate 
higher returns in future periods. Lower profitability and liquidity in combination with higher leverage and uncertainty 
about firms‟ future potential would give a negative signal to investors about firms‟ current financial performance and 
future potential. Consequently, this would tend to have a negative impact on firms‟ stock returns. Indeed, Panel B 
shows that firms with high stock volatility experience negative stock returns (AR).
6
 Given their high stock return 
volatility and despite their lower profitability, the specific firms appear to distribute higher dividend payout (DIVSH) 
in order to attract investors and improve their market profile. The fact that firms with high stock volatility are larger 
(SALESHA) shows that large firms are subjected to public scrutiny and examination, which means that their stock 
return is more volatile and sensitive to investors‟ perceptions and understanding of managers‟ actions. In a similar 
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vein, the K-W test (Panel B of Table 2) shows that firms with high stock return volatility display lower stock returns 
and liquidity, and higher size, growth and leverage measures. 
 
5.3.1 Factors That Influence The Stock Returns 
 
Panel C of Table 1 shows that firm financial measures do affect stock returns. Therefore, H0 3 can be rejected. 
The behaviour of stock returns is closely associated with firm financial numbers and performance. Investors tend to 
favour stable stock returns (Gordon, 1964). This implies that unstable and volatile stock returns might adversely 
impact on investors‟ perceptions. The size of the market reaction to stock return volatility would of course depend 
upon investors‟ investment preferences. Indeed, Panel C shows that volatility in stock returns (VOLAT) appears to 
adversely affect firms‟ stock returns.  
 
The results show that the stock market appears to appreciate favourable firm financial figures, and tends to 
reward firms accordingly. In particular, size (SALETAS), profitability (OPM and ROSC) and liquidity (CASH) 
appear to positively influence the stock returns. Also, the distribution of dividends to shareholders (DIVSH and 
DIVCOV) has a positive impact on stock returns. The price to earnings ratio (PE), which reflects firms‟ future 
prospects and potential, is positively valued by market participants, and positively affects the stock returns. It should 
be stressed that when assessing a firm‟s financial performance, PE should be carefully examined, because in certain 
cases, it may be overvalued. Therefore, it should be set against the average figure of the sector or the market. Panel C 
shows that the stock returns are positively affected by signs of positive managerial performance. In particular, paying 
creditors (CREDT) timely gives a positive sign to the stock market about firms‟ credibility, and at the same time 
enhances firms‟ creditability. The finding that high leverage (DEBTE) affects the stock returns positively signifies 
that firms would have more capital available to support their investment plans and reinforce their growth potential. In 
the specific set of results, it appears that the high leverage does not adversely affect firms‟ liquidity, profitability or 
stock returns. 
 
5.3.2 Factors That Influence The Volatility In Stock Returns 
 
Panel D of Table 1 shows that the volatility in stock returns is significantly affected by firm financial 
measures. Thus, H0 3.1 can be rejected. The volatility in stock returns expresses the sensitivity of stock returns to firm 
financial performance and uncertainty. Assuming that large firms attract more political and regulatory attention than 
small firms, the actions and financial results of the former would tend to affect investors‟ perceptions and have a more 
sound impact on stock returns (Zimmerman, 1983). This would therefore affect the behaviour of stock returns, which 
would be expressed in terms of higher or lower volatility depending upon the expectations and preferences of the 
stock market. Indeed, the results show that the volatility in stock returns is significantly affected by firm size 
(SALESHA and NAVSH). Similar considerations would apply in the case of intangibles to total assets (INTTA) and 
holdings to total assets (HOLTA), which carry significantly positive coefficients. It follows that the uncertainty 
regarding the valuation and carrying value of intangibles, and the benefits or losses that are related to holdings would 
be expected to influence firms‟ stock returns, and potentially make them more volatile. Higher leverage measures 
(TLSFU and DEBTE) in association with lower profitability (ROCE), liquidity (CFM) and interest cover (INTCOV) 
would certainly lead to volatile stock returns, reflecting investors‟ worries about firms‟ financial integrity and future 
prospects. The considerations above would lead to a situation where firms would be unable or less able to pay back 
timely and in consistency with the debt agreements. This situation would worsen firms‟ financial position and further 
increase the volatility in stock returns. Indeed, Panel D shows that the creditor turnover (CREDT) carries a negative 
coefficient. Following the findings described above, it can be inferred that high volatility in stock returns would tend 
to negatively impact on stock returns. The results are consistent with this statement, and show that stock returns (AR) 
carry a negative coefficient.  
 
5.4.1 ATHEX And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel E of Table 1 shows that constituent firms and non-constituent firms of ATHEX exhibit significantly 
different financial attributes. Thus, H0 4 can be rejected. Panel E shows that firms that belong to ATHEX are larger 
(NAVSH) and exhibit higher holdings to total assets (HOLTA). They also display higher leverage measures (TLSFU 
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and DEBTE). Despite the higher leverage and the related financial costs, the specific firms appear to exhibit higher 
profitability (OPM and ROCE) and liquidity (QUI and CFM). This should give a positive signal to the stock market 
about the robustness of their profitability and liquidity, and also reinforce their financial position and creditability. 
Constituent firms of ATHEX would tend to receive attention by market participants and government authorities. It 
appears, therefore, that since their actions are visible and subjected to scrutiny, they would seek to make careful 
financial decisions and exhibit a favourable financial picture. The results of the K-W test (Panel C of Table 2) are 
similar with those of the logistic regression presented above, and also show that firms that belong to ATHEX exhibit 
higher dividend payout and positive stock returns. 
 
5.4.2 E-Income vs. ATHEX 
 
Panel F of Table 1 shows that firms that belong to E-Income exhibit different financial characteristics 
compared to firms that belong to ATHEX. Thus, H0 4.1 can be rejected. Panel F indicates that constituent firms of E-
Income tend to be larger (SALESHA) and display higher liquidity (CFM). They also exhibit higher profitability (EPS 
and OPM) and distribute higher dividends (DIVSH). Following their higher profitability and liquidity, the specific 
firms appear to adequately meet their financial obligations. In particular, they display higher creditor turnover 
(CREDT) and interest cover (INTCOV). Overall, the results show that firms that belong to E-Income tend to exhibit 
favourable financial numbers, which appear to influence their stock market picture and positively impact on their 
stock returns (AR). The K-W test (Panel D of Table 2) shows that firms that belong to E-Income exhibit higher 
profitability, dividend payout and positive stock returns. 
 
5.4.3 E-IPO vs. ATHEX 
 
Panel G of Table 1 shows that firms that belong to E-IPO are significantly different compared to the 
constituent firms of ATHEX. Therefore, H0 4.1 can be rejected. As expected, firms that form E-IPO tend to exhibit 
higher growth measures (MVBV) and price to earnings ratio (PE). They also are more profitable (NPM) and exhibit 
higher leverage (DEBTE). This implies that along with using equity finance following their flotation on the ASE, they 
also use borrowings to finance their expansion and growth. To appear more attractive and improve their financial 
picture, the specific firms distribute higher dividends (DIVSH) to shareholders and pay their creditors (CREDT) 
timely. They also display lower debtor turnover (DEBT), which signifies that they extend their credit policy to attract 
more customers and influence their profitability positively. Panel G shows that due to the fact that firms that belong to 
E-IPO are new-listed on the ASE, their stock returns display higher volatility (VOLAT). The K-W test (Panel E of 
Table 2) shows that firms that belong to E-IPO are larger, and exhibit higher profitability, liquidity, leverage, dividend 
payout and volatility in stock returns. 
 
5.4.4 FTSE 20 vs. E-Income 
 
Panel H of Table 1 shows that firms that belong to FTSE 20 display significantly different financial 
characteristics compared to firms that form E-Income.
7
 Thus, H0 4.1 can be rejected. Panel H indicates that constituent 
firms of FTSE 20 tend to be larger (SALESHA) and exhibit higher leverage (TLSFU). In contrast, firms that belong to 
E-Income are more profitable (EPS) and display higher growth potential (MVBV). The results show that between 
firms that belong to FTSE 20 and firms that belong to E-Income, the latter experience higher stock returns (AR), 
implying that the stock market attributes higher value to firms with higher profitability and future prospects. The 
results of the K-W test (Panel F of Table 2) are similar with those of the logistic regression presented above. 
 
5.4.5 FTSE International vs. E-Income 
 
Panel I of Table 1 shows that firms that belong to FTSE International are significantly different compared to 
the constituent firms of E-Income. Thus, H0 4.1 can be rejected. The results show that firms that belong to FTSE 
International are larger (SALETAS) and exhibit higher holdings to total assets (HOLTA). To meet their business 
objectives and support their corporate strategy domestically and internationally, the specific firms tend to use higher 
debt capital (DEBTE). Their higher leverage appears to adversely affect their profitability (EPS), liquidity (CFSH) 
and dividend payout (DIVSH). The international exposure and the higher related risk of the firms that belong to FTSE 
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International, in association with their lower profitability, appear to introduce volatility in their stock returns 
(VOLAT). The K-W test (Panel G of Table 2) shows that firms that belong to FTSE International are larger, and 
exhibit lower profitability, higher leverage and volatility in stock returns. 
 
5.5.1 Size And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel J of Table 1 shows that large firms exhibit significantly different financial attributes compared to small 
firms. Thus, H0 5 can be rejected. The categorization of the sample firms is performed using the market value (MV). 
The dependent dummy variable in the logistic regression takes 1 for large firms, and 0 for small firms.  
 
 The accounting policy choice and actions of large firms are highly visible and subjected to criticism and 
judgment by various financial and non-financial interested parties, including trade unions, environmental and 
government authorities, community representatives, etc. Therefore, large firms are inclined to build a solid financial 
and business picture to avoid political costs, and meet the needs and expectations of the interested parties. Panel J 
shows that large firms exhibit lower growth measures (MVBV), implying that, ceteris paribus, the rate of marginal 
growth for a large firm would tend to be lower compared to a small firm that is at the beninning of its operation. 
Failing to meet their financial obligations and abide by the underlying debt covenants would have severe implications 
for large firms. Although large firms display higher leverage measures (DEBTE), their profitability is not affected 
negatively. In contrast, they exhibit higher profitability (ROCE), dividend payout (DIVSH) and liquidity (CUR). As 
expected, large firms exhibit higher holdings to total assets (HOLTA), while they display lower debtor turnover 
(DEBT). This implies that the sales policy of large firms is such that they sell on credit to attract more customers and 
increase their revenues. The lower debtor turnover does not appear to adversely affect their creditor turnover 
(CREDT), which is found to be higher for large firms. The financial figures of large firms that are presented above 
constitute an overall favourable financial picture, which seems to be appreciated by the stock market as it appears by 
the positive coefficient of stock returns (AR). The K-W test (Panel H of Table 2) shows that large firms exhibit higher 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, holdings to total assets, dividend payout and positive stock returns. 
 
5.5.2 Growth And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel K of Table 1 shows that firms with high growth prospects are significantly different compared to firms with low 
growth measures. Thus, H0 5 can be rejected. The categorization of the sample firms is performed using the variable 
“market value to book value” (MVBV) (see Collins and Kothari, 1989). The dependent dummy variable in the logistic 
regression takes 1 for high growth firms, and 0 for low growth firms.  
 
Following the higher uncertainty that characterizes their future prospects, high growth firms experience 
higher volatility in stock returns (VOLAT). They also are smaller (NAVSH and SALETAS), implying that, under 
certain circumstances, a small firm is more likely to grow larger in the future than a firm that is already large. Panel K 
shows that high growth firms have higher intangible assets (INTTA), including investments, development projects, 
etc., that are likely to generate returns in future periods. This potential is also reflected by the higher price to earnings 
ratio (PE) that high growth firms exhibit. Despite their higher leverage measures (TLSFU and DEBTE), the specific 
set of firms appears to be more profitable (NPM, ROCE and EPS), and also pay higher dividends (DIVSH). The 
higher debtor turnover (DEBT) shows that high growth firms collect debts quickly, in order to reinforce their 
operations and liquidity, and eventually their growth potential. Likewise, the K-W test (Panel I of Table 2) shows that 
high growth firms are smaller, and exhibit higher profitability, liquidity, leverage, dividend payout and volatility in 
stock returns. 
 
5.5.3 Profitability And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel L of Table 1 shows that firms with high profitability exhibit significantly different financial attributes 
compared to firms with low profitability. Thus, H0 5 can be rejected. The categorization of the sample firms is 
performed using the earnings per share (EPS). The dependent dummy variable in the logistic regression takes 1 for 
high profitability firms, and 0 for low profitability firms.  
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 High profitability firms tend to be larger (SALESHA) and exhibit higher holdings to total assets (HOLTA). 
They also exhibit higher growth measures (MVBV) and price to earnings ratio (PE). Following their higher 
profitability, the specific firms distribute higher dividends (DIVSH) to their shareholders. High profitability firms 
display higher debtor turnover (DEBT), which allows them to pay their creditors timely (CREDT) and positively 
affect their liquidity (CFM). Panel L shows that the higher leverage (IGEAR) that they exhibit does not appear to 
impact negatively on their financial performance. In fact, high profitability firms are able to adequately meet their 
interest expenses as it is shown by the positive coefficient of interest cover (INTCOV). The higher profitability 
together with the favourable financial figures and growth potential of the specific set of firms appear to have a positive 
impact on their stock returns (AR). The K-W test (Panel J of Table 2) shows that high profitability firms display 
higher size, growth, liquidity, leverage, dividend payout and positive stock returns. 
 
5.5.4 Liquidity And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel M of Table 1 shows that firms with high liquidity are significantly different compared to firms with 
low liquidity. Hence, H0 5 can be rejected. The categorization of the sample firms is performed using the current ratio 
(CUR). The dependent dummy variable in the logistic regression takes 1 for high liquidity firms, and 0 for low 
liquidity firms.  
 
 The results show that high liquidity firms are larger (SALETAS) and more profitable (NPM and ROSC). 
They also exhibit higher debtor (DEBT), creditor (CREDT) and stock (STOCKT) turnover. This shows that high 
liquidity firms sell their stock and collect debts quickly, and thus, they are able to pay their creditors timely. This 
would tend to increase their reliability and reputation, and further strengthen their creditability. High liquidity firms 
also exhibit higher leverage (CGEAR), which does not appear to adversely affect their profitability. In fact, their 
higher profitability, allows them to meet their interest obligations, and thus, display higher interest cover (INTCOV). 
The favourable financial performance of high liquidity firms that is described above together with the higher dividend 
(DIVCOV) that they pay to shareholders would tend to improve their financial profile and positively influence their 
stock returns (AR). The K-W test (Panel K of Table 2) shows that high liquidity firms are larger, and display higher 
profitability, dividend payout and price to earnings ratio. In contrast to the results of the logistic regression presented 
above, the specific firms appear to exhibit lower leverage measures. 
 
5.5.5 Leverage And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel N of Table 1 shows that firms with high leverage exhibit significantly different financial attributes 
compared to firms with low leverage. Thus, H0 5 can be rejected. The categorization of the sample firms is performed 
using the variable “debt to equity” (DEBTE). The dependent dummy variable in the logistic regression takes 1 for 
high leverage firms, and 0 for low leverage firms.  
 
 High leverage firms appear to be larger (SALESHA) and exhibit higher growth prospects (MVBV) and price 
to earnings ratio (PE). The latter attributes show that the specific firms use more debt capital in order to facilitate and 
support their growth potential. Following their higher level of borrowing, high leverage firms display lower 
profitability (NPM, ROCE and EPS). To enhance their liquidity (CFM) and their ability to faithfully meet their 
financial obligations, high leverage firms collect debts quickly (DEBT), and at the same time, they exhibit higher 
stock turnover (STOCKT). This implies that money is tied up for less time in stocks, and thus, firms get to make profit 
on the stock quicker, which would in turn reinforce their competitive position and liquidity. Despite their lower 
profitability, high leverage firms appear to retain a smaller amount of profits (PLOWB), in order to pay higher 
dividends (DIVCOV and DIVYI), and thus, attract more investors and obtain more equity finance. The K-W test 
(Panel L of Table 2) shows that high leverage firms are larger, while they appear to exhibit lower liquidity.   
 
5.6 Dividend Distribution And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel O of Table 1 shows that firms that distribute dividends are significantly different compared to firms 
that pay no dividends to shareholders. Thus, H0 6 can be rejected. The results indicate that firms that pay dividends 
tend to be larger (NAVSH), and as expected, they exhibit higher profitability measures (OPM, NPM and EPS). They 
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also display higher leverage (DEBTE), which does not affect negatively their profitability or dividend policy. Firms 
may in fact distribute dividends in order to impress the market participants, and give positive signals to stakeholders, 
such as lenders and financial institutions, about their financial position and prospects. The higher leverage that they 
exhibit and the financial obligations that result do not appear to have a negative impact on their liquidity. Panel O 
shows that firms that pay dividends display higher liquidity (CFM), which is reinforced by the higher debtor turnover 
(DEBT) that they exhibit. The specific firms also display higher price to earnings ratio (PE), which implies that they 
possibly operate in a growth area, and thus, they pay dividends to attract investors and satisfy the market‟s 
expectations and perceptions. The results of the K-W test (Panel M of Table 2) are similar with those of the logistic 
regression presented above, and also show that firms that pay dividends display higher growth measures and positive 
stock returns.  
 
5.7 Trading Volume And Firms’ Financial Attributes 
 
Panel P of Table 1 shows that firms that display a positive change in trading volume have distinctive 
financial characteristics compared to firms with negative change in trading volume. Therefore, H0 7 can be rejected. 
The results show that investors are attracted by firms that are credible and exhibit strong financial performance and 
promising future prospects. In particular, firms with positive change in trading volume tend to exhibit higher growth 
measures (MVBV) and appear to be more profitable (ROSC). The specific firms display higher liquidity (CUR), and 
also are able to pay their creditors (CREDT) timely. They display a positive change in trading volume, implying that 
they attract investors‟ interest, also because they exhibit lower leverage (DEBTE). Lower leverage signifies that firms 
will incur lower interest expenses, and that debt covenants will possibly be less restrictive. The specific firms also 
display higher dividend payout (DIVSH and DIVCOV), which would tend to be appreciated by investors. Overall, the 
results indicate that firms with positive change in trading volume exhibit a favourable financial picture, which appears 
to satisfy investors and lead to positive stock returns (AR). The results of the K-W test (Panel N of Table 2) are 
similar with those of the logistic regression presented above, and also show that firms that display a positive change in 
trading volume appear to be larger.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This study describes the financial characteristics of firms listed on the ASE in association with their stock 
return behaviour. It is evident that high volatility in stock returns is negatively associated with stock returns. It appears 
that in order to positively influence their stock returns, firms need not just maximize their profits or minimize their 
costs. They also need to identify and meet market participants‟ needs. In particular, they need to provide assurance 
that they abide by the regulation and that their accounting statements reflect their true and fair view and assist in the 
development of correct predictions about firms‟ future financial performance. High liquidity and dividend payout, and 
significant growth prospects accompanied by solid profitability appear to positively impact on stock returns. On the 
other hand, uncertainty about firms‟ future performance would introduce volatility in stock returns.  
 
With regard to the ASE indices, firms that belong to the primary ASE index, i.e. ATHEX, overall display 
higher size, leverage, profitability and liquidity. It appears that in comparison with firms outside ATHEX, the specific 
firms are subjected to more intensive scrutiny and inspection. Thus, they tend to structure their decision-making and 
policy choice so as to improve their financial picture and positively influence investors‟ perceptions. Firms that are 
inside a stock market index appear to be more careful and tend to take seriously into account financial analysts‟ 
forecasts and investors‟ expectations. It appears that the financial attributes and actions of firms that belong to market 
indices are highly associated with the categorization criteria and objectives of each respective index. For example, the 
actions and choices of new-listed firms that form E-IPO aim to strengthen their financial position as well as attract 
more investors and impress the market participants. In general, firms that attract investors‟ interest and exhibit high 
trading volume tend to display higher growth, profitability and dividend payout.  
 
The study has assessed listed firms‟ financial performance based on size, growth, profitability, liquidity and 
leverage. It appears that firms tend to display lower retained earnings and pay higher dividends, even if they exhibit 
relatively higher leverage and lower profits, in order to attract investors. In a similar vein, firms tend to pay their 
creditors timely and show higher creditor turnover in order to satisfy the creditors as well as other potential lenders 
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and market participants. This happens especially when firms have high leverage. Firms that are politically visible, 
either in terms of size or profitability, tend to exhibit high awareness in their actions and decisions to avoid political 
costs or attracting the attention of authorities. Firms with high growth tend to display high leverage to support their 
expansion. Firms, especially those with high profitability, appear to take into account earnings forecasts and structure 
their accounting policy choices accordingly, in order not to make investors sceptical about their managerial abilities 
and future prospects.  
 
This study is useful for investors, financial analysts, accounting regulators and stock market authorities. It 
gives significant insight about listed firms‟ financial profile and covers major aspects of their business and financial 
performance. The study enhances the understanding of regulators and government authorities about listed firms‟ 
financial characteristics and needs, which would enable them to improve the current accounting regulation, reinforce 
the current auditing and supervisory framework, and better protect investors‟ interests. In that respect, the study gives 
significant insight to investors about the behaviour of stock returns and the factors that influence their fluctuation, 
which should be considered when investors set up their portfolios and investment strategy. The study, therefore, 
contributes to the improvement of the current market setting aiming at the attraction of foreign capital, the reflection 
of the true and fair firm financial picture on stock returns, and the immediate and correct reaction of stock prices to the 
announcement of financial events. Categorising the sample firms based on key accounting measures, the study 
provides a scanning of the Athens stock market. This provides a break-down of listed firms‟ financial position, 
attributes and behaviour, and can be the basis for the reinforcement of the efficiency of the stock market, the reduction 
of earnings manipulation, and the making of efficient decisions. Overall, the study provides the setting that users of 
accounting information could use to describe and interpret the stock return behaviour in association with firm 
financial numbers and changes. 
 
Notes 
 
1
 Following that shareholders generally prefer a stable income stream to volatile earnings (Gordon, 1964), firms may 
resort to hedging in order to reduce the adverse impact of earnings volatility on their accounting numbers and 
financial position, stock returns and compensation (Fama, 1980; Ndubizu and Tsetsekos, 1992). 
2
 It is evident that stock returns are more sensitive to financial analysts‟ forecasts of firm financial performance than to 
changes in accounting numbers themselves (Chung and Jo, 1996; La Porta, 1996). According to Imhoff (1992), 
financial analysts attribute higher value to firms with more predictable earnings, smaller forecast revisions, lower 
probability of bad news announcements, stable performance and profitability measures over time, and whose 
accounting numbers meet the respective forecasts. 
3
 In an efficient stock market, the stock returns should faithfully and reliably reflect the firms‟ actions and decisions. 
In this case, the stock returns would depict the true and fair view of the firm. The examination of the association 
between the financial attributes of listed firms and the sign of the stock returns is closely related to how efficient the 
Athens stock market is, and how well market participants see through firms‟ judgement and operations. 
4
 FTSE 20 and FTSE International have been designed by the ASE in collaboration with the London Stock Exchange 
and FTSE International Limited. 
5
 To categorise firms into those with high and low volatility in stock returns, the analysis has also been performed 
using the coefficient of variation, i.e. standard deviation divided by the mean of annual stock returns. The results (not 
presented here) appear to be similar with those presented in the paper. 
6
 The study has also used the Pearson correlation test to capture the relationship between stock volatility and stock 
returns. The results (not presented here) show that the volatility in stock returns is negatively correlated with stock 
returns. 
7
 The comparison between firms that belong to FTSE 20 and ATHEX (not presented here) shows that the former tend 
to exhibit higher size (SALESHA), leverage (DEBTE) and profitability (NPM). They also display higher stock returns 
(AR).  
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Appendix 1 Sample industrial sectors 
Industry No of Firms 
Chemicals 11 
Construction and building materials 39 
Industrial goods and services 25 
Food and beverage 34 
Retail 16 
Health care 7 
Basic resources 17 
Travel and leisure 18 
Media and entertainment 15 
Oil and gas 4 
Personal care and household products 41 
Technology 22 
Telecommunications 2 
Utilities 3 
Total 254 
 
 
Appendix 2 Accounting measures used as explanatory variables 
Size  
MV Market value 
BV Book value 
SALES Turnover 
SALESHA Sales per share 
NAVSH Net asset value per share 
SALETAS Sales to total assets 
Growth  
MVBV Market value to book value 
Profitability  
OPM Operating profit margin 
NPM Net profit margin 
ROSC Return on shareholders‟ capital 
ROCE Return on capital employed 
EPS Earnings per share 
Liquidity  
STOCKT Stock turnover 
CREDT Creditor turnover 
DEBT Debtor turnover 
CUR Current ratio 
CASH Cash ratio 
QUI Quick (acid) ratio 
CFM Cash flow margin 
CFSH Cash flow per share 
Leverage  
TLSFU Total liabilities to shareholders‟ funds 
CGEAR Capital gearing 
INTCOV Interest cover 
IGEAR Income gearing 
DEBTE Debt to equity 
Other variables  
INTTA Intangibles to total assets 
HOLTA Holdings to total assets 
AR Annual stock returns 
VOLAT Volatility in annual stock returns 
DIVSH Dividend per share 
DIVYI Dividend yield 
DIVCOV Dividend cover 
PLOWB Plowback (retention) ratio 
PE Price to earnings ratio 
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